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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the relationship between the optimal weight on output gap in the central bank's loss function and 
the degree of inertia in a hybrid version of New Keynesian model with a pure discretionary inflation targeting. I show 
that under endogenous persistence of inflation dynamics, even in discretionary monetary policy regime, a Rogoff's 
(1985) conservative central banker does not necessarily improve social welfare.
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2 Model and Calculation
2.1 Hybrid New Keynesian Model
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2.2 Ination Targeting under Discretion
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2.3 Numerical Analysis
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Result 1 (Nonmonotonicity of Optimal Policy Weight)                        
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Remark 1 (Nonoptimality of Conservative Central Bankers)                   
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2.4 Discussion
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Impulse Response of Output Gap to Cost Shock
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